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Competition
This paper launches a series of papers devoted to the questions of identification
and selection of structural (institutional) alternative for securing economic
exchanges under the conditions of non-uniform distribution of the significant
information about the characteristics of goods and services, and in the presence
of agent's inclination to the opportunistic behaviour on the assumption of impunity
of such behaviour. The main objective of the paper is to establish a conceptual
framework for studying the questions of deregulation of the economy. The differences
between the compensation of the market failures and their elimination are examined,
and also the possibility of the use of non-regulatory alternatives as a mean of
compensation of the market failures is discussed. The important characteristics
of goods, which can influence a selection of structural alternative, are pointed
out. Distinguishing three spheres of economic exchange (political, financial and
commodity), the problems concerning the use of simpler mechanisms of contract
relations management in view of transition of the goods from one category to another
are described. The suggestions concerning the optimization of system of dependent
institutions and enterprises by the example of Federal Supervision Service in
the field of consumer protection and human well - being are brought forward. The
principal terms and notions used in the paper are defined.
Key terms: regulation, deregulation, regulation
reform, market failures, transaction costs.
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